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THE CHALLENGE OF CHRISTIAN
PSYCHOTHERAPY

Then saith he unto them, My soul is exceeding sorrowful,
even unto death: tarry ye here, and watch with me.
-Matthew 26:38
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Few questions have so animated the discourse of the philosopher and the priest, the physician and the poet, as why it is we suffer
and what our suffering might possibly mean. Of course, the question has never been solely the province of the scholar or the professional, as can be attested by any parent who has had to look on
helplessly as a young child wastes away in a hospital bed. The implications of how this most pressing question of life is answered are
profound. As Truman Madsen (1966) has noted, for some "the most
staggering objection to belief in a personal God is the ugly, tragic,
overwhelming fact of human inequality and suffering" (p. 53).
Paradoxically, others have found in suffering not only the most
divine assurances of God's enduring love but also the overpowering
call to brotherhood and full humanity. Mother Teresa, for example,
taught that "in the slums, in the broken body, in the children, we see
Christ and we touch him" (Muggeridge, 1971, p. 114). Clearly, in
addressing the question of suffering, we are not just playing with
some "academic toy" (Madsen, 1966, p. 53) but are dealing with an
issue of immense and potentially soul-rending human significance.
Despite a lengthy, rich, and sometimes contentious history ofliterary, philosophical, and theological inquiry into the problem of
human suffering, our modern world has increasingly come to rely
on psychological and psychotherapeutic explanations of suffering's
origins and meaning. Indeed, many scholars have argued that psychology has come to compete for and in large measure usurp the
cultural and intellectual space once occupied by religion, literature,
and moral philosophy (see, for example, Hooykaas, 1972; Szasz,
1978; Vandenberg, 1991; Vitz, 1977). It has become commonplace in
our society to believe that psychologists not only hold the keys that
will unlock the mystery of suffering but also possess the techniques
necessary for eliminating it. Because of this assumption, psychologists are often afforded the sort of status and respect that was in earlier times reserved for priests and prophets, sages, and shamans.
I intend to argue, however, that some of contemporary psychology's more popular ways of conceiving suffering are very much at
odds with the understanding of it found in ancient and modern
revelation and are, thus, for Latter-day Saints deeply problematicboth intellectually and spiritually. Although not always explicitly articulated, many of the theories and practices of modern psychotherapy
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are undergirded with a philosophy of hedonism. That is to say, much
of the modern psychotherapeutic enterprise is informed by the
"doctrine that pleasure is the good" and that the maximizing of individual pleasure is "what we ought to pursue" (Gosling, 2000, p. 336).
One result of this commitment to hedonism in psychology is, I
will contend, that human emotional, psychological, and moral
suffering often are regarded only as obstacles to our attainment of
happiness and the good life. Indeed, it will be shown that a number
of prominent schools of thought in contemporary psychotherapy
assume that suffering is essentially pointless and unnecessary, the
unpleasant byproduct of some impersonal pathological process,
defect of rationality, or biochemical deficiency. As such, it is "without intrinsic meaning" and is "seen as some sort of absurdity"
(Vitz, 1977, p. 103). It is with this view that psychotherapists so
often set their agenda solely in terms of how to most effectively
mitigate-if not terminate-the various forms of psychologically
relevant human suffering. That such suffering may have profoundly
spiritual and moral meaning receives little attention (d. YoungEisendrath,1998).
In what follows, then, I hope to show that, although this sort of
psychotherapeutic project seems morally sound, it fundamentally
misses the point of suffering-particularly when understood from
within the context of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Insofar as psychology's hedonistic conception of suffering is mistaken and insofar as
we therapists endorse that conception in either our theories or our
practices, we may hinder our clients from developing a morally
deep and spiritually significant life. By minimizing or neglecting the
inherent meaningfulness of human suffering, we may prevent our
clients from coming to understand, in the words of Viktor Frankl
(1986), that "human life can be fulfilled not only in creating and
enjoying, but also in suffering!" 1 (italics in the original) and that "life

1. Frankl did not say that suffering can be "fulfilling" in human life, but he
does state that in suffering human life can be "fulfilled." He did not suggest that
suffering is a fulfilling way to live one's life, as though it were just one more possible method or means of achieving some level of personal satisfaction or contentment. For Frankl, we are all, by virtue of being human, called to fulfill our lives, as we
would a duty or an obligation, without regard to the degree or amount of personal
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can reach nobility even as it founders on the rocks" (p. 106).
Ultimately, I will propose that, while the call to alleviate suffering is
undoubtedly central to both the theory and practice of psychotherapy, there is a spiritually deeper and more pressing call to which we
as therapists must first give heed: the demand for us to suffer with
our clients in their suffering, to "watch and pray" (Matt. 26:41) as
they experience the agonies of their own Gethsemanes.
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The Intellectual Roots of Hedonism

The roots of our Western intellectual tradition begin with the
Greeks-and thus the roots of hedonism do also. The individual
most often affiliated with the hedonist position is Epicurus, who
contended "that all men, at all times, pursue only their own pleasure" (Russell, 1945, p. 245) because "pleasure is the first good and
natural" (Epicurus, 1981, p. 294). Interestingly, however, Epicurus
was not the first to advance the notion that we are by nature selfish
and seek only after our own personal pleasure. An earlier advocate
of hedonism was Thrasymachus, a contemporary of Socrates and
Plato, a man dubbed by one noted historian of philosophy as the
"brutal champion of the rights of the stronger" (Copleston, 1985,
p. 95). Unlike Epicurus, who would suggest that the greatest pleasure was to be found in moderate living aimed at minimizing pain,
Thrasymachus argued a "might-is-right" approach to justice and
ethics, maintaining that because personal pleasure is the ultimate
good those with the means to get what they want should in fact do
just that (d. Plato, 1961, pp. 588-589).
Ironically, even Socrates, who consistently sought to counter
this sophistic equation of physical pleasure with the ultimate good,
still maintained at the core of his teachings the notion that conduct
is governed by a concern for matters of personal pleasure. Socratic
doctrine held that acts that produce pleasure are always to be
judged in light of their ultimate rather than immediate benefit.
Because the unreflective pursuit of pleasure may lead one only to

satisfaction to be garnered. Indeed, for Frankl, finding meaning in our lives, whatever our circumstances might be, is our ultimate duty-to ourselves, others, and
God. It is vital to keep this distinction clearly in mind to see how Frankl avoids
falling into one or another of the more traditional forms of egoism.

55

Turning
'Freud
Upside

'Down

56

future misery, the relative worth of a given course of action should
be determined by whether or not it provides long-term or ultimate
benefit (i.e., pleasure) to the person. Thus, as Guthrie (1950) has
noted, in the Socratic or Platonic system, "acts which in themselves
give pleasure can be referred to the question of ultimate benefit as
to a higher standard, while still maintaining the attitude of pure
self-interest" (p. 103).
In the end, then, for many ancient Greek thinkers, though they
disagreed continually and vehemently about the proper means of its
achievement, the ultimate goal of life was always the pursuit and
maximization of pleasure for one's self. Even Aristotle, who questioned the thinking of his predecessors and contemporaries in
many profoundly insightful ways, nonetheless held that our most
committed and concerned friendships were in reality just the outgrowth of a more fundamental love of self.
Although eclipsed somewhat by intensive theological speculation, various versions of the hedonist doctrine continued to inform
philosophical thought in significant ways throughout the medieval
period. A great deal of intellectual effort during this time was
devoted to demonstrating how service to God and obedience to his
commandments were, when considered most broadly, really just
matters of self-interest. For example, St. Augustine (K. Rogers, 1997)
argued, "For, that man might be intelligent in his self-love, there was
appointed for him an end to which he might refer all his actions,
that he might be blessed. For he who loves himself wishes nothing
else than this. And the end set before him is 'to draw near to God'"
(p. 60). St. Augustine urged his fellow Christians to ask themselves
what earthly and transitory pleasure could possibly compare to
the eternal rewards of heaven that are to be made available to the
obedient and dutiful. Christians should then ask whether it is in
their own best interests to do all they can to secure such eternal
bliss for themselves.
Indeed, as St. Thomas Aquinas later reasoned, if contemplation
of ultimate reality is the greatest good and God is the ultimate reality, then our greatest opportunity for the single-minded contemplation of God is in the afterlife, and the more single-minded our
contemplation, the greater our joy (cf. Rogers, 1997, pp. 61-73). The

individual who settles for the evanescent pleasures of mortal flesh is
a fool who will fail in the end to secure that which is the most truly
gratifying of all pleasures: eternal communion with God.
Interestingly, despite this tradition of assuming self-interest to
be central to human endeavor, it was not until the Enlightenment
that hedonism achieved a nearly undisputed predominance in
explanations of human motivation and behavior. Thomas Hobbes's
Leviathan (1968), for example, offered an account of human motivation wherein self-preservation and self-aggrandizement were not
only right but natural and absolute. He contended that we are naturally constituted to seek to ensure our own survival and pleasure,
regardless of the costs to others. In fact, Hobbes maintained that our
natural inclination as human beings is to wage unrestrained war on
one another so as to maximize material acquisitions and power.
Furthermore, if not for the controlling influence of a powerful and
organized state capable of imposing its will on the individual via
the threat of force or the promise of security, the "life of man
[would be] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes,
1968, part 1, chap. 13, p. 186). The impact of this Hobbesian doctrine
for later political, social, and intellectual developments can hardly
be underestimated. 2
One profound consequence of the modern advancement of the
doctrine of hedonism is that hedonism has, in many ways, come to
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2. For example, by deftly mixing the influences of Hobbes and Epicurus,
Jeremy Bentham (1914) was able to assert that "nature has placed mankind under
the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure" (p. 1) and that "each
individual always pursues what he believes to be his own happiness" (Russell, 1945,
p. 775). Based on this fundamental assumption of self-interest, Bentham then proposed what has come to be known as the utilitarian system of rationality and
ethics, a system that has proven to be enormously influential in contemporary law,
politics, economics, and philosophy. Following closely in Bentham's footsteps,
John Stuart Mill (1969) wrote, "Of the social virtues it is almost superfluous to
speak; so completely is it the verdict of all experience that selfishness is natural. .
[The people we regard as moral are simply selfish in a different way;] theirs is .
[a] sympathetic selfishness" (p. 394). By the middle of the 19th century, particularly
with the advent of Darwinian evolutionary theory and subsequent biological
accounts of human behavior, hedonism had clearly begun to take center stage in
the political, moral, and social thought of the West (d. Ruse, 1999; Smith, 1997).
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be identified with rational thinking. Henry Sidgwick (1981), for
example, felt that it was
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hardly going too far to say that common sense assumes that
"interested" actions, tending to promote the agent's happiness,
are prima facie [at first sight] reasonable: and that the onus
probandi [burden of proof] lies with those who maintain that disinterested conduct, as such, is reasonable. (p. 120)

Ayn Rand (1964) argued that the rational person "sees his interests in
terms of a lifetime and selects his goals accordingly.... [This] means
that he does not regard any moment as cut off from the context of
the rest of his life, and that he allows no conflicts or contradictions
between his short-range and long-range interests" (p. 51-52). Thus,
to be rational is to seek after one's own interests in a manner as
careful, consistent, and efficient as possible (cf. Shaver, 1999).
To fall short in the realization of this ideal-or, even worse, to
reject it outright-is by definition to be irrational. Indeed, as
Nathaniel Branden (1964), one of Rand's collaborators, explained,
"To sacrifice one's happiness is to sacrifice one's desires; to sacrifice
one's desires is to sacrifice one's values; to sacrifice one's values is to
sacrifice one's judgment; to sacrifice one's judgment is to sacrifice
one's mind" (p. 41). Given this sort of intellectual presumption, it
should not come as too great a surprise that one of the most explicitly hedonistic of all our modern theories of human action, and one
of the most widely endorsed in both the humanities and the social
sciences, is known as Rational Choice Theory (cf. Becker, 1976;
Coleman & Fararo, 1992).3

3. In his text Theory and Progress in Social Science, James B. Rule (1997)
identified three essential tenets of the Rational Choice school of thought. First is
the notion that "human action is essentially instrumental, so that most social
behavior can be explained as efforts to attain one or another, more or less distant,
endls]" (p. 80; italics in original). Second, individual actors "formulate their conduct through rational calculation of which among alternate courses of action are
most likely to maximize their overall rewards" (p. 80; italics in original). The third
and final tenet of Rational Choice Theory is that "large-scale social processes and
arrangements-including such diverse things as rates, institutions, and practicesare ultimately to be explained as results of such calculation[sj" (p. 80). This last
point, according to Rule (1997), is a crucial claim for adherents of the theory, in that
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Hedonism, Psychotherapy, and Suffering

As a product of modern philosophical thought, psychotherapy
often reflects a strong intellectual commitment-both in terms
of its theories and its practices-to the epistemology and ethics of
hedonism. Because psychotherapy has, in many ways, become the
major modern attempt to address the question of the good life, it
has been intimately concerned with the question of human emotional, spiritual, and moral suffering. As mentioned above, our
modern world has increasingly come to look to psychologists for
answers to questions about the meaning of life and suffering. The
therapist, as a highly trained expert in human affairs, is often
thought to be uniquely situated to offer not only rationally based
explanations for the presence of suffering but also empirically defensible counsel on how best to achieve happiness in life (cf. Gantt, 2001;
Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999).
In close connection with this assumption is psychotherapy's
long-maintained belief that the personal views and values of clinicians and therapists have little direct effect on clients, at least insofar
as those values are conscientiously set aside in the therapy hour by
the careful employment of established methods and techniques of
treatment. It was thought that the therapist could be "a kind ofhorticulturist engaged in bringing out the true nature of each client by
encouraging a process of unfolding along predetermined lines"
(Wallach & Wallach, 1983, p. 17). This assumption, however, has
been convincingly proven to be fallacious as many authors have
shown the inextricable connection between moral values and therapeutic practice (see, for example, Bergin, Payne, & Richards, 1996;
Kurtines, Azmitia, & Gewirtz, 1992; Howard, 1985; Woolfolk, 1998).
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere (Gantt, 2001), clients come
away from therapy with a good deal more than a simple, value-free
cure for their psychological ills. During the course of most psychotherapeutic treatments, clients are initiated into the language,
customs, assumptions, values, and practices of an entire moral
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the "doctrine provides the indispensable analytical tools for relating aggregate
events and processes to the microworlds of face-to-face interaction and individual
decision making" (p. 81).
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order within which they are encouraged to make sense of themselves, their symptoms, and the world. This initiation is not simply
an academic or intellectual exercise, however. It is, rather, "an active
moving into and shaping of [the client's] life in the light of the
therapist-patient dialectic" (Barton, 1974, p. 238).
Clearly, one of the most profound ways in which therapists give
shape to the moral an.d psychological landscape of their clients' lives
is the way in which they help clients to articulate and pursue a particular vision of the good life. Unfortunately, there is an astonishing
lack of sustained or critical discussion concerning the various metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical presuppositions inherent in
psychotherapy's often hedonistic conceptions of the good life.
Therapists seem content simply to iterate, in various ways, the fundamental virtues of self-fulfillment, self-expression, self-esteem,
self-discovery, self-love, and self-acceptance. Suffering, in the broad
spectrum of its psychologically relevant manifestations (e.g., depression, anxiety, fear, shame, grief, guilt, and regret), is usually conceived of as an obstacle to the realization of individual potential. As
such, suffering is seen to constitute a sort of barrier that must be
overcome if individuals are to attain a maximal degree of happiness
and contentment in their lives (Young-Eisendrath, 1998).
Because the various psychological forms of suffering are so
often viewed as pathological or irrational in nature, psychotherapy's
commitment to eradicating their effects in as efficient and timely a
manner as possible is seldom held up for critical scrutiny.4 Rather,
the issue that seems to have most fully captured the discipline's
attention is the more methodological one of how best to reduce or
eliminate the unpleasantness of those pathological conditions from
which clients happen to be suffering.

4. A few notable exceptions to this rule are The Brighter Side of Human
Nature: Altruism and Empathy in Everyday Life by Alfie Kohn (1990); Michael and
Lise Wallach's (1983) Psychology's Sanction for Selfishness: The Error of Egoism in
Theory and Therapy; Paul Vitz's (1977) Psychology as Religion: The Cult of SelfWorship; George Kunz's (1998) Paradox of Power and Weakness: Levinas and an
Alternative Paradigm for Psychology; and Frank Richardson, Blaine Fowers, and
Charles Guignon's (1999) Re-Envisioning Psychology: Moral Dimensions of Theory
and Practice.
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Given the vast and varied nature of the landscape, it would be
all but impossible in the limited space available here to even begin
adequately identifying the many ways in which hedonistic assumptions suffuse contemporary psychotherapy. Therefore, rather than
reel off some comprehensive, but only marginally informative, list
of schools and practices, I will attempt a more in-depth look at a
few of the more widely practiced modern therapies. In particular, I
will examine Albert Ellis's school of Rational Emotive Behavior
Therapy (REBT), the Client-Centered Therapy of Carl Rogers, and,
finally, certain trends in contemporary drug therapy. Although I
realize the limited scope involved in such an analysis, I nonetheless
feel strongly that each of these traditions can be seen to be exemplars of the larger discipline of psychotherapy.
Albert Ellis, Hedonism, and Suffering. Perhaps one of the
clearest modern exponents of the notion that suffering is irrational-and, by implication, pointless-is Albert Ellis, who has
maintained that "one of the basic philosophic aspects of rationalemotive therapy ... is an emphasis on hedonism, pleasure, and happiness" (1962, p. 336). Ellis has stated that, at least in this regard, his
Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy is no different from most other
forms of therapy in that
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just about all existing schools of psychotherapy are, at bottom,
hedonistic, in that they hold that pleasure or freedom from pain
is a principle good and should be the aim of thought and
action.... The rational-emotive therapist, therefore, is far from
unique when he accepts some kind of a hedonistic world-view
and tries to help his patients adopt a workable hedonistic way of
life. (p. 363)

Although he has repeatedly asserted that his main therapeutic goal
is to minimize the irrational anxiety, depression, and anger his
clients feel, Ellis is not content with merely a negative definition of
psychological health and well-being. Rather, in a more positive vein,
he has argued that the rational-emotive therapist should encourage
clients to adopt the notion that "it is good for me to live and enjoy
myself" and decide to "strive for more pleasure than pain" (Ellis,
1973> p. 23).
Because hedonism is assumed to be identical with rationality in
this system of therapy, suffering, in whatever psychological form it
61
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might take, is ipso facto irrational, the product of an inappropriately directed style of living and reasoning. Because it is irrational,
suffering is also pointless and unnecessary. The solution to the
dilemma of suffering is to simply adopt a more "healthy" and
rational style of living and thinking, one that will prove to be more
personally satisfying and self-enriching.
Ellis does not, however, advocate a "short-range, self-defeating
hedonism of a childish variety" (1962, p. 336). Rather, that immature
form of hedonism is spurned in favor of a more long-range form of
hedonism, one that is clearly reminiscent of that found in ancient
Stoic philosophy. Borrowing terminology from Freud, Ellis (1962)
suggests that "the reality principle of putting off present pleasures
for future gains is often a much saner course to follow than the
pleasure principle of striving only for present gains" (p. 363; italics
added). In short, Ellis (1962) has argued for
the philosophy that one should primarily strive for one's own satisfactions while, at the same time, keeping in mind that one will
achieve one's own best good, in most instances, by giving up
immediate gratifications for future gains and by being courteous
to and considerate of others, so that they will not sabotage one's
own ends. (p. 134)

This philosophy of long-range hedonism is "consistently
stressed in RT" (Ellis, 1962, p. 363) so that clients will come to understand that the unhappiness they are experiencing is ultimately the
result of failing to engage in the rational calculation and pursuit of
their own long-term self-interest. As Ellis (1962) has stated, "The
main aim of RT is to help the patient to clearly see what his own
basic philosophic assumptions or values are and to significantly
change these life premises" (p. 348). If these irrational values are not
"significantly changed" (i.e., abandoned in favor of a philosophy of
long-term hedonism), however, the client's "underlying anxiety and
lack of self-confidence will not be greatly ameliorated" (p. 349).
Carl Rogers, Hedonism, and Suffering. In contemporary psychotherapy, Ellis is, of course, not the only major voice advocating
the notion that suffering is irrational, pathological, and pointless.
Carl Rogers, too, offered an essentially hedonistic answer to the
questions of suffering and the good life. For Rogers, achievement of
62

the psychological good life is understood in terms of becoming a
"Fully Functioning Person" (Rogers, 1961, pp. 183-196). This is a person whose self-concept is congruent with his or her inherent tendency to value positively those experiences that increase personal
fulfilment and satisfaction, a person who is "open to the wide range
of his own needs" and who is a full "participant in the rationality of
his organism" (Rogers, 1961, pp. 194, 195). Such a person is creative,
sensitive, and thoughtful, a being whose feelings and reactions "may
be trusted to be positive, forward-moving, and constructive"
(Rogers, 1961, p. 194). In short, because the fully functioning person
"does not have to satisfy the introjected standards of other people,
he or she is guided entirely by the organismic valuing process and
enjoys total self-acceptance" (Ewen, 1998, p. 396).
Clearly, in this particular scheme, the basic nature of
humankind is held to be constructive, trustworthy, and rational. In
response to the Freudian notion that human beings are basically
irrational and governed by aggressive and destructive impulses
that must be controlled, Rogers (1961) argued that "man's behavior is exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity toward the goals his organism is endeavoring to achieve"
(pp. 194-195). In the fully functioning, genuinely rational person,
there is a "natural and internal balancing of one need against
another, and the discovery of behaviors which follow the vector
most closely approximating the satisfaction of all needs" (Rogers,
1961, p. 195). Unfortunately, according to Rogers (1961), "the tragedy
for most of us is that our defenses keep us from being aware of this
rationality, so that consciously we are moving in one direction,
while organismically we are moving in another" (p. 195). Only when
the individual manages to overcome irrational defensiveness and
embrace a genuine openness to experience will behavior "come as
close as possible to satisfying all his needs" (Rogers, 1961, p. 190).
Therapy, then, is about assisting the suffering client in overcoming the burdensome weight of irrational defensiveness (i.e.,
conditions of worth) so that "he would continue to move toward
becoming himself, and to behave in such a way as to provide the
maximum satisfaction of his deepest needs" (Rogers, 1961, p. 194).
Suffering, as understood in the Rogerian framework, is capable of
only two meanings: symptom and obstacle. Suffering, in its various
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forms, represents a symptomatic expression of an underlying
incongruence or disharmony in the individual's life and organismic
experience. Likewise, as symptom, suffering points to the presence
of a barrier obstructing the achievement of the individual's natural
and rational pursuit of his or her own self-interest. The role of the
therapist is not to assist the client in exploring the existential
significance and possible moral meaningfulness of suffering but
rather it is to help the client "to consider each stimulus, need, and
demand, its relative intensity and importance, and out of this complex weighing and balancing, discover that course of action which
would come closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation"
(Rogers, 1961, p. 190).
Psychopharmacology, Hedonism, and Suffering. At the opposite end of the therapeutic spectrum from both the REBT and clientcentered approaches is an increasingly popular way of understanding
and treating human suffering and distress: psychopharmacology.
Rosenzweig and Leiman (1989) pointed out that
although in the past many psychiatric dysfunctions have been
approached from an exclusively psychological framework, current efforts have developed a distinctly biological orientation.
This orientation is leading to progressive refinements of the categories of mental disorders such as schizophrenia and anxiety.
This accomplishment is aiding not only understanding but also
therapeutic interventions. (pp. 600-601)

One of the most obvious ways in which such biological
"refinements" have impacted clinical theory and practice in recent
years is seen in the astonishing rise of both the use and the acceptance of medication for the treatment of emotional, social, and
interpersonal problems. Indeed, it was only a decade ago that
Peter Kramer, a psychiatrist at Brown University, coined the troubling phrase "cosmetic psychopharmacology" (cited in Shorter,
1997, p. 314) and, thereby, ushered in a new era of psychopharmacological hedonism. 5

5. Interestingly, Kramer's phrase appeared in print at roughly the same time as
President George H. W. Bush's congressional resolution declaring 1990 to be the
first year of the Decade of the Brain.
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For Kramer (1993) and like-minded others (e.g., Banich, 1997;
Kolb & Whishaw, 2000), human emotional and interpersonal
suffering is at root an expression of an underlying medical condition. That is, suffering is in reality just the symptomatic manifestation of a disturbance in the neurochemical activity of the
individual's central nervous system. The brain, Seward (1999) told
us, "has one extremely important characteristic: it is capable of
emotions" (p. 33). Those emotions that the brain creates for us,
however, are often unpleasant and distressing and, thus, less than
desirable. The most appropriate remedy for such a situation, then,
would seem to be a chemical one (Cooper, Bloom, & Roth, 1996).
After all, as Nancy Andreasen (1984) suggested, emotional and psychological suffering are diseases and "should be considered medical
illnesses just as diabetes, heart disease, and cancer are" (p. 29). It is
in this sense that Goodwin (1986) asserted that not only is talking
therapy of little real value when compared to drug therapy but it
can even make "people feel worse; talking about the problems
reminds them of them" (p. 107).
In its most basic sense, psychopharmacological intervention
involves altering an individual's neurotransmitter activity to reduce
or eliminate the patient's presenting symptoms (Feldman, Meyer, &
Quenzer, 1997). Symptom reduction has long been-at least in psychiatry-the primary (if not the only) standard for judging the
worth or success of a particular therapeutic treatment (Luborsky,
Singer, & Luborsky, 1975). Indeed, Shorter (1997) noted in his widely
cited history of psychiatry that "lifting symptoms rather than cultivating a sympathetic rapport in the office [has] remained the ultimate therapeutic objective" (p. 314). In this model, the patient's
presenting symptoms-the experiential features and enactments of
his or her suffering-constitute a sort of diagnostic signpost that
points toward some more basic, underlying biochemical dysfunction that is the real source of the patient's problems. The medical
model reduction of the complex experiential meaning of suffering
to the status of symptom is almost never questioned, and neither is
the notion that the first order of therapeutic business is the elimination of such symptoms. Suffering is not to be taken at face value, nor
is it thought to possess any intrinsic meaning or significance. Rather,
it is seen merely to be an unfortunate outcome of fundamentally
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impersonal and mechanical biological processes operating out of
the individual's awareness and beyond his or her control.
Despite a number of glaring differences in terms of both theory and practice, the psychopharmacological perspective clearly
shares with its humanistic and cognitive cousins a commitment to
the philosophy of hedonism. As Shorter (1997, p. 324) and others
noted, "Psychiatry [has] nurtured a popular culture of pharmacological hedonism" in which millions of people (both clients and
professionals) have come to see drug therapy as the ultimate technological solution to the problems of everyday living. Evidence for
this claim can be found in Kramer's (1993) international bestseller,
Listening to Prozac, the principal message of which seems to be that
personal contentment and self-confidence can, indeed, be found
in a pill.
For example, Kramer (1993) offered the following story to illustrate the promise of pharmacological solutions to the problems of
human suffering:
After about eight months off medication, Tess told me she was
slipping. ''I'm not myself," she said. New union negotiations were
under way, and she felt she could use the sense of stability, the
invulnerability to attack, that Prozac gave her. Here was a
dilemma for me. Ought I to provide medication to someone who
was not depressed? I could give myself reason enough-construe
it that Tess was sliding into relapse, which perhaps she was. In
truth, I assumed I would be medicating Tess's chronic condition,
call it what you will: heightened awareness of the needs of others,
sensitivity to conflict, residual damage to self-esteem-all odd
indications for medication. I discussed the dilemma with her, but
then I did not hesitate to write the prescription. Who was I to
withhold from her the bounties of science? Tess responded again
as she had hoped she would, with renewed confidence, selfassurance, and social comfort. (p. 10)

This account clearly implies that the only genuinely rational and
moral response to Tess's unhappiness and dissatisfaction with her
life was to provide a biochemical means of replacing her pointless
suffering with a chemically induced sense of satisfaction. 6 Kramer
6. The most disturbing feature of this account is, at least for me, the fact that,
despite the obvious dilemma involved here, when the moment for action came Dr.
Kramer did not hesitate to provide a chemical solution. Indeed, it almost seems as
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(1993) further argued that drug therapy "simply gives anhedonic

people access to pleasures identical to those enjoyed by other normal people in their ordinary social pursuits" (p. 265). Notice the
rhetoric of normality and rationality at play in this pronouncement. Anxiety, depression, and isolation, it is assumed, are really
just nonrational, biomechanical conditions that can be fairly easily
swept aside if we just deliver the proper dosage at the proper time.
As in Ellis's and Roger's models, suffering in itself is pointless and
unnecessary. Indeed, it is abnormal and dysfunctional. The maximization of individual pleasure is the point of our existence-or so
we are told-and, in this case, psychoactive medication the most
rational and efficient means for its achievement. 7
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The Christian Alternative
It is instructive to contrast these psychotherapeutic conceptions

of suffering with those articulated in the canons of revealed
Christianity. Holy scripture clearly teaches that suffering is not
"some sort of absurdity" (Vitz, 1977, p. 103) bereft of any genuine
meaningfulness, a sort of accident to be overcome or managed or
even anesthetized. Rather, scripture teaches us that suffering is a
challenge to be lived, an obligation to be shouldered, a meaning to
be found. For example, in the biblical account of Job, we are confronted with a righteous man's struggle with a bewildering array of
afflictions. While the story of Job does not provide a single, simple
answer to the question of human suffering, it does suggest "that
affliction, if not for punishment, may be for experience, discipline,
and instruction" (Bible Dictionary, "Job," LDS KJV, 1986, p. 714).

though Kramer feared the guilt that might ensue should he violate the hedonistic
imperative to provide Tess with some quick chemical relief from the stresses and
strains of her life. The presumption seems to be that a man of science ought to do
all he can to assist his patient in the pursuit of maximum pleasure and selfsatisfaction-particularly if the means of procuring such satisfaction is as simple
as the dash of a pen and the filling of a prescription.
7. For many today, particularly third-party payers, the efficiency and speed
with which psychopharmacological interventions work is the strongest argument
in their favor. After all, why waste all those months working to establish an environment of trust and care and openness in the consulting room when a prescription
treatment regimen can be implemented and significant symptom reduction
observed-in just a few visits?
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Likewise, while unjustly imprisoned in Liberty Jail, the Prophet
Joseph Smith learned that his suffering had both meaning and
purpose when the Lord stated that though "the very jaws of hell
shall gape open the mouth wide after thee ... all these things shall
give thee experience, and shall be for thy good" (D&C 122:7).
As Christians, we acknowledge that suffering is an obvious feature-and, perhaps, in some ways an unavoidable feature-of our
mortality. We also maintain that suffering can playa vital role in
our salvation-though not merely as a test of moral character or of
the capacity for endurance. Rather, for the Christian, suffering is a
powerful way in which one can come to understand and experience
the depth of Heavenly Father's love for his children. Suffering,
though not something to seek for its own sake,s nonetheless can
provide-in some small and incomplete way-insight into the
infinite suffering experienced by our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ
on our behalf, as well as a clearer understanding of the infinite love
that motivated such suffering. This understanding is never solely
intellectual but rather is also deeply and profoundly experiential
and, thus, deeply and profoundly spiritual.
Because we recognize the intrinsic meaning and importance of
suffering, we Christian therapists are in a position to see that there
is a deeper issue involved in the question of suffering than simply
how it can be most efficiently alleviated. For the Christian psychotherapist, then, the fundamental moral question incumbent in
the suffering of our clients is not how it is to be alleviated but first
how it is to be addressed in the community of faith. How are we as

8. One obvious counterexample that might be offered in objection to this claim
is fasting. As commonly understood, fasting is a sort of self-imposed suffering
wherein one abstains from food and drink for a given length of time. However, a
careful reading of modern revelation teaches that fasting is a form of prayer and
communion with God, the real purpose of which is not suffering but rather comfort
and communication. For example, Hills (1992) suggested in the Encyclopedia of
Mormonism that "a person may fast when seeking spiritual enlightenment or guidance in decision making, strength to overcome weakness or endure trial, comfort in
sorrow, or help at other times of special need" (p. 501; italics added). Clearly, fasting is
not so much a matter of suffering for its own sake as it is a divinely inspired means
whereby we may commune with Deity-especially in times of suffering and hardship. It is interesting to note also that in Doctrine and Covenants 59:13-15 the Lord
explicitly identifies fasting not only with prayer but also with joy and rejoicing.
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practicing psychotherapists-and, more fundamentally, as disciples
of Christ-to understand and respond to the suffering of others?
I am not suggesting, of course, that as Christians we are not
concerned with alleviating suffering. Quite the contrary. The proper
way to address the suffering of others may be, in many instances, to
do all we can to ease it. After all, Isaiah demands that we "relieve the
oppressed" and "plead for the widow" (Isa. 1:17), while Alma commands us to "mourn with those that mourn; yea, and comfort those
that stand in need of comfort" (Mosiah 18:9). However, we should
be careful not to read into these and other prophetic injunctions a
simplistic-and ultimately hollow-hedonism. Instead, we must
realize that mourning with those who mourn and comforting those
who stand in need of comfort may well involve a great deal more of
us than alleviating their suffering. It may also involve a commitment to suffer with them in their trials as they struggle to find
meaning in them (d. 1 Cor. 12:25-26; see also Gantt, 2000). It may
demand that we truly do take upon ourselves one another's burdens
and thereby open ourselves to the glorious possibilities of a genuinely loving and Christlike relationship.
One of the clearest and most poignant modern examples of one
who was "willing to mourn with those that mourn" (Mosiah 18:9),
one who had, in the words of Jude, "compassion, making a
difference" (Jude 1:22), was Mother Teresa. Here was a woman well
acquainted with the faces and demands of suffering in all its painful
and disheartening forms, a woman whose life was spent tirelessly
ministering to the needs and wants of her brothers and sisters
amidst the most horrifying and piteous conditions imaginable.
Here was a woman whose life has much to tell us about how the
Christian should address the suffering of others. Speaking of her
work among the poor and helpless in the ghettos of Calcutta,
Mother Teresa said:
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Without our suffering [here], our work would just be social work,
very good and helpful, but it would not be the work of Jesus
Christ, not part of the Redemption. Jesus wanted to help by sharing our life, our loneliness, our agony, our death.... We are
allowed to do the same; all the desolation of the poor people, not
only their material poverty, but their spiritual destitution, must
be redeemed, and we must share it, for only by being one with
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them can we redeem them, that is, by bringing God into their
lives and bringing them to God. (Mother Teresa, 1975, p. 3, as cited
in Inchausti, 1991, pp. 67-68)
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One of the most striking aspects of Mother Teresa's comment is
the way she completely identified the work of Christ with suffering
with others in their suffering. Indeed, she suggested that sharing in
the suffering of others is not so much a duty or an obligation or
even a commandment as it is an opportunity and a blessing. We are
allowed, she said, to live the way our Savior did, to be with and for
others as he was. The redeeming work of Christ, she taught, takes
place in the concrete moment of suffering and in the compassionate
sharing of that suffering. For us to truly participate in the work of
Christ, it is never enough to just follow the commandments and be
morally concerned for the welfare of others-especially if our
moral concern is enacted only in a detached or abstracted fashion
or only when we find it convenient or personally profitable. For
Mother Teresa, the work of Christ is to share in the loneliness, the
pain, and the fear of those sufferers who confront us.
As Christ bore the afflictions and sufferings of all mankind, we,
too, are called upon to bear the burdens of our brothers and sisters
who, in their suffering, call upon us for aid. All the while we should
remember that, no matter how much we give of ourselves or how
deeply we share in another's pain, the real miracle of redemption is
ultimately the product of Christ's loving sacrifice. And while we
may be called to participate in the work of redemption, in the end it
is the Master whose work it is, and it is to him and him alone that
we must direct those for whom and with whom we would suffer.
One further feature of Mother Teresa's comments deserves
attention. In her mind, the compassionate service she and her fellow
nuns were rendering to the poor, the sick, and the needy in the
streets of Calcutta was in some way very different from what she
called "social work:' It is not that social work-what will be taken
here to include psychotherapy-is necessarily detrimental or
unhelpful but rather that, at least as traditionally conceived, it is not
the work of God (Feister, 2004).
I am quite convinced that she is right on this point. I am not
fully convinced, however, that such a distinction is a fundamental

one-that the social work of psychotherapy cannot also be the
(social) work of God. Indeed, I sincerely believe that not only can it
be the work of God but it must be the work of God. Expending our
efforts in any other work is ultimately a waste of time-our own,
our clients', and God's. I am convinced that the gospel of Jesus
Christ calls upon us to radically reconceptualize and reenvision the
project of psychotherapy-from the ground up-so that it can
become yet another means by which we can accomplish the work of
God here among his children.
Although admittedly sketchy and in need of further development, the point I wish to make most strongly here is that we need to
reenvision psychotherapy as first and foremost a way of responding
to the call to suffer with our clients in their sufferings rather than
think of therapy as only an educational vehicle for the identification
and satisfaction of individual desires (Gantt, 2000). Prior to entertaining the question of how to most efficiently meliorate our client's
suffering, or whether we should even do so, we need to seriously
entertain the question of our client's suffering itself-its possible
meanings, purposes, and our own and our client's moral responsibilities in the face of it. The fruit of such consideration would likely
be the recognition that suffering is not something to be dismissed
out of hand as a pointless obstacle to personal fulfillment but is
something that can be embraced on its own terms and whose
meaning can be explored and articulated. We might also learn that
our discipline's desire to relieve suffering as efficiently as possible
actually short-circuits an important existential and spiritual process
intended to bring souls to Christ.
By focusing so intently on symptom reduction and assuming
that the rational calculation and pursuit of self-interest is synonymous with the good life, modern psychotherapy may have robbed
many people of the opportunity of developing a morally deep and
spiritually significant relationship with both their fellow beings
and their Savior. As President Spencer W. Kimball (1982) taught,
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Being human, we would expel from our lives, sorrow, distress,
physical pain, and mental anguish and assure ourselves of continual ease and comfort. But if we closed the doors upon such, we
might be evicting our greatest friends and benefactors. Suffering
can make saints of people as they learn patience, long-suffering,
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and self-mastery. The sufferings of our Savior were part of his
education. (p. 168)
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If suffering is one way we can come to Christ, to experience the miracle of the Atonement by coming to learn the meanings his atoning
sacrifice has for us, then any therapy that denies the importance or
meaning of suffering or seeks to minimize it prematurely is in need
of our most serious reevaluation.

Some Clarifications
At this point, to avoid some possible misunderstandings, I will
clarify what is not being suggested in this analysis. First, the point
that alleviating suffering is still an important goal of psychotherapy
bears repeating one more time and in a bit more detail. Although it
is possible to vigorously debate the appropriateness or the viability
of some of the therapeutic means that have been suggested for alleviating suffering, it would be farcical to debate the importance that
the alleviation of suffering has for the psychotherapeutic enterprise.
I am not proposing that psychotherapists need not be concerned
about relieving the suffering of those who seek out their services.
Rather, my proposal is that we subordinate the noble desire to alleviate suffering to the more fundamental moral demands to share
the suffering of others and to care for the redemption of their souls.
We should pay careful heed to the hedonistic origins of many of our
traditional psychological conceptions of suffering, of its origins,
nature, and meaning. We should respond to such conceptions by
more explicitly addressing the question of suffering from within the
framework of the gospel of Jesus Christ-a framework that is fundamentally antithetical to that of hedonism.
Second, I am not suggesting that the job of the therapist is to
advocate suffering or to encourage others to indulge in it. That
would simply be to assume the hedonist argument in reverse.
Casting the psychotherapist as sadist is not the solution I seek. As
Broderick (1992) noted in the Encyclopedia of Mormonism,
Latter-day Saints do not believe that pain is intrinsically good. In
their teaching there is little of asceticism, mortification, or negative spirituality.... If benefit comes from pain, it is not because
there is anything inherently cleansing in pain itself. Suffering can
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wound and embitter and darken a soul as surely as it can purify
and refine and illumine. (p. 1422)
The key for us as Latter-day Saint therapists, then, is not to encourage our clients to glory in their suffering, as though the mere experience of anguish were sufficient to sanctify and cleanse the soul,
but rather to help them appreciate that their suffering can have
meaning and that in their suffering they are never alone or bereft of
hope. Despair is never the answer. Thus, we cannot teach that
suffering is something to be sought or celebrated for its own sake.
Rather, it is something that must be accepted, at least for a time, and
something that we must strive to endure with a "steadfastness in
Christ, having a perfect brightness of hope, and a love of God and of
all men" (2 Ne. 31:20).
Of course, not all forms of suffering are of the same sort, and
not all forms of suffering should be addressed in the same manner.
As Broderick (1992) again noted,
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As a social being, man is vulnerable to emotional suffering that
often rivals physical pain-anxiety, rejection, loneliness,
despair. Among the sensitive there are also other levels of profound suffering. They may relate, for example, to the awareness
of the effects of sin or the anguish of the abuse or indifference of
one's loved ones. And there is vicarious suffering in response to
the pain around one and the sense of the withdrawal of the
Spirit. (p. 1421)
It is important to add that there are those who choose to suffer
because they derive some perverse joy from it, either from the attention they may receive or the guilt and sympathy they may induce.
Addressing such suffering clearly requires more of the therapist
than simply "playing along." Conversely, there are those who suffer
in innocence, the helpless and tragic victims of others' violence,
greed, and hatred. To such we must offer, without reservation, the
hand of fellowship and the healing balm of Gilead (see Jer. 8:21-22).
It is also important that there be no confusion regarding what is
meant by the concept of suffering with others in their suffering.
This concept, at least in this article, should not be taken to be synonymous with either condescending pity or despairing commiseration. To genuinely suffer with another does not mean that I allow
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you to "cry in my beer" while I cry in yours as we both self-servingly
bemoan the miserable cosmic unfairness of our lot in life. That sort
of "sorrowing of the damned" has no part whatsoever in the
authentic therapeutic encounter. Neither is suffering with another a
means of justifying or excusing the often immoral and sinful behaviors that lie at the root of many forms of suffering. 9 To truly suffer
with another requires far more than convenient co-misery, simplistic sympathy, or a readiness to excuse. Rather, in suffering with
another we willingly and selflessly take upon ourselves their pains
and torments so that the burdens they bear may be lightened. To suffer
with others is to offer oneself wholly and unreservedly to another, a
gift of the fullest and sincerest compassion. lo
Obviously, in a philosophical or conceptual exploration such as
this, it is difficult to spell out exactly what suffering with another
might look like in any given therapeutic encounter. What is being
proposed here is not so much a technical approach to the practice of
therapy as it is a fundamental mind-set of openness and Christlike
compassion and, thereby, a framework for re-envisioning the entire
therapeutic process. Thus, there are probably many different ways
in which a particular therapist might suffer with a specific client in
a specific therapeutic moment. At the very least, however, genuinely
suffering with a client would seem to require a willing suspension of
the therapist's professional detachment and value-neutral stance

9. On this point, President Spencer W. Kimball (1982) taught, "There are many
causes for human suffering-including war, disease, and poverty-and the
suffering that proceeds from each of these is very real, but I would not be true to
my trust if I did not say that the most persistent cause of human suffering, that
suffering which causes the deepest pain, is sin-the violation of the commandments given to us by God" (p. 155).
10. Obviously, the question of therapist "burnout" could be raised here.
Emotional fatigue amongst therapists has not only been a long-standing problem
in the profession but also in recent decades has become a growing one (see, for
example, McCarthy & Frieze, 1999). It might be argued that, should therapists follow my suggestions in this paper and truly suffer with their clients, the likely outcome would be an increase in the incidence of therapist burnout. Unfortunately,
space limitations will not allow for an adequate response to such questions.
Nonetheless, I will voice my suspicion that most therapist burnout might be
explained by the fact that, relying on secular and self-oriented models of therapy,
many therapists have only their own, finite emotional resources to draw upon in
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towards that client's suffering. Further, it would most certainly
require the therapist to be deeply attuned and responsive to the
whisperings of the Spirit so that he or she might know in any given
moment how to respond to the client as Christ himself would
respond. Relying solely on technique and abstract treatment strategy will almost certainly short-circuit the real healing that comes
through a genuine encounter with Christ that is facilitated by a
therapist willing to serve him. Perhaps, in the final analysis, what
matters is not the "how" of therapy but the "why" that lies behind
whatever action the therapist feels called upon to take.
Still, it might well be asked, What are the practical benefits and
advantages of suffering-with over other possible approaches to
therapy? Such a concern is, however, rooted in the hedonistic
understanding of psychotherapy being called into question here.
The point of suffering with clients is not that it results in improved
therapeutic outcomes or more efficiently speeds clients back to
health and productive contentment. It is that we fulfill the sacred
duty we have been enjoined by Christ to take upon ourselves.
As Christian therapists, we offer ourselves to our clients,
because they are, in fact, our brothers and sisters and because doing
so is right and good and true. The willingness to make such an
offering arises out of the spiritual desire to do all we can to serve our
brothers and sisters and, thereby, glorify God. Indeed, as Joseph
Smith taught, "The nearer we get to our heavenly Father, the more
we are disposed to look with compassion on perishing souls; we feel
that we want to take them upon our shoulders, and cast their sins
behind our backs" (Smith, 1993, p. 270; see also Isa. 38:17).

'J{edonism,

Suffering,
and
'Redemption

dealing with the often overwhelming suffering they encounter in the consulting
room. The Christian therapist, however, recognizes that his or her own resources
are far too meager for the momentous task at hand and that ultimately it is Christ's
infinite love and compassion upon which he or she must draw in order to truly
suffer with a client. By fully and unreservedly relying upon the Lord in conducting
his or her therapeutic work, the Christian therapist will most certainly be sustained, sanctified, and renewed in that work. One is reminded, for example, of the
Lord's support of Alma and his people in their bondage to the Lamanites: "And
now it came to pass that the burdens which were laid upon Alma and his brethren
were made light; yea, the Lord did strengthen them that they could bear up their
burdens with ease, and they did submit cheerfully and with patience to all the will
of the Lord" (Mosiah 24:15).
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This should not be taken to mean, however, that the therapist is
the transformative agent in the life of the client or that the discovery
of meaning in suffering is the result of the therapist's having shared
in the client's pain. To assume such would be to engage in a particularly pernicious form of priestcraft wherein the therapist is set up as a
savior and mediator of the sufferings of others. Our call as
Christians and as therapists is not to set ourselves as "a light unto the
world, that [we] may get gain and praise of the world" (2 Ne. 26:29)
but rather to attend to the needs of others as they work out the
meanings of their relationship with God. Only insofar as our willingness to emulate the Savior by sharing in the suffering of another
serves to point them toward deeper possibilities of knowing God,
his love for them, and their own complete reliance upon the power
of his saving grace will our therapeutic efforts be genuinely therapeutic. I do not believe this point can be emphasized too much or
too strongly. We must never lose sight of the fact that it is only in
light of the infinite and atoning sacrifice of our Lord and Savior,
Jesus Christ, that our clients will be able to come to find meaning in
their suffering and, even then, only insofar as they allow him to
instruct them in its meaning.
As Alma the Younger taught, Christ took upon himself our
pains and afflictions "that his bowels may be filled with mercy,
according to the flesh, that he may know according to the flesh how to
succor his people according to their infirmities" (Alma 7:12; italics
added). Thus, as therapists we must never forget that Christ understands the suffering of our clients in ways that we, even at the best of
times, can only barely begin to imagine. Nonetheless, we have an
absolute obligation to take up their sorrows, to share in their
suffering, and to do all we can to help make a space in our clients'
lives wherein they can experience the atoning love and healing
power of the Master. Ultimately, it is only insofar as we heed this call
and shoulder this sacred obligation that our work as psychotherapists can cease to be mere social work and truly become the redeeming work of God.
It is also important to recognize that I am not proposing a therapeutic technique here, as though suffering with others in their
suffering were just some new treatment strategy that could be
employed over the course of a given therapy to increase the likelihood
of a successful outcome. Suffering with others is not "a channel by

which the therapist communicates a sensItIve empathy and an
unconditional positive regard" (Kirschenbaum & Henderson, 1989,
p. 233). This is not to say that technique is never warranted in therapy or that it has no place or purpose in our therapeutic endeavors.
Neither does it mean that medication has no role to play in therapy.
Rather, it is only to say that the call to suffer with others in the
moment of their anguish is morally prior to the implementation of
any treatment method or technique. Method and technique must
always be guided by and subordinated to our fundamentally moral
responsibility to the client in his or her suffering. Only as
psychotherapy comes to admit this moral priority will it become
truly therapeutic in the fullest and richest sense of that word. 11
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11. The Greek word from which we derive the term therapy is therapeia, a term
that denotes service or attendance as well as healing. Additionally, it connotes an
act of service, or "tending to," which is freely and devotedly given rather than
forced or purchased (for a more detailed treatment of this point, see Williams and
Faulconer, 1994, p. 346).
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